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Ethical Reasons and Political Commitments  
Lisa Rivera  
Abstract Politicalcommitmentstoresistoppressionplayacentralroleinthemoral lives 
of many people. Such commitments are also a source of ethical reasons. They 
influence and organize ethical beliefs, emotions and reasons in an ongoing way. 
Political commitments to address oppression often contain a concern for the 
dignity and well-being of others and the objects of political commitments often 
have value, according to ideal moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian 
theory. However, ideal moral theories do not fully explain the ethical reasons 
political commitments engender. First, ideal moral theories do not explain the 
normative priority that agents give to politically committed ethical reasons. Their 
profound effect on a politically committed agent’s ethical deliberation and choice 
and the precedence they are given over other ends cannot be wholly understood 
through the moral obligations within ideal theories. Second, although politically 
committed reasons are valuable in ideal theory for the benefits they bring to 
others, they are not fungible with other reasons ideal theory would regard as 
having equal ethical value. A person might substitute another beneficial 
humanitarian aim for that to which she is politically committed and nevertheless 
regard herself as having done a morally wrong thing for failing or betraying her 
commitment. Politically committed ethical reasons are also motivated and 
informed by the social location of agents and their relationship to structures of 
oppression. Although there are universal ethical reasons to oppose oppression, this 
means that some of a person’s actual ethical reasons will be irreducibly particular.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Berta Cáceres, a Honduran citizen and Lenca activist, is the coordinator of 
COPINH, the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of 
Honduras, which represents indigenous people in the Lenca territory of Honduras. 
COPINH has been engaged in a long-term struggle that is both local and 
transnational: fighting both to gain Lenca autonomy within Honduran borders, and 
to oppose the neo- liberal economic and military policy that has a devastating 
effect on the Lenca and other indigenous peoples in Central America. COPINH 
has a long history of political action but most recently focused its energy on 
preventing the build- ing of the El Tigre hydroelectric dam, which is displacing the 
Lenca and many others.1  
I met Berta in 2001 in Quebec City, while she was on a speaking tour in Canada 
prior to a major protest during a hemispheric trade meeting. Over the course of 
several days of conversation, Berta discussed her life history and the choices she 
made to continue her political work even when opportunities arose for an easier or 
safer life. She, her family, and her comrades, have endured political persecution as 
a result of her activism.2 She has also refused jobs sponsored by the powerful 
institutions she opposes, such as the World Bank. Although this work would have 
provided income for her family, she saw the offers as attempts to co-opt 
movement leaders.  
Berta’s work rallies international support for the cause of Lenca autonomy and 
survival. Thus, her work is partly an act of moral suasion: she aims to convince 
people who may have no knowledge or interest in the issues that concern her to 
use their own social, political, and economic power as American or Canadian cit- 
izens to support her cause. She must also try to engage national and international 
powers in the hope that they will come to respect Lenca concerns. Further, she has 
to create local awareness of the larger global context within which the local 
struggles are taking place. She sees her struggle in the larger context of similar 
struggles of oppressed people and makes alliances with other indigenous and 
political groups.  
Although our political commitments may be less exigent than Berta’s, many of us 
orient our lives around them. Here, I will focus primarily on people whose lives 
and choices are shaped by their political commitment to address sex, race, class, or 
other oppressions. For such people, political commitment is fundamental to ethical 
deliberation and choice. If we have political commitments ourselves or experience 
their importance in others’ lives, it should be obvious that political commitments 
are straightforwardly an important part of the ethical lives people hope to lead. 
Yet, they tend to be invisible in traditional moral theorizing. In this chapter, I offer 
evi- dence to support Charles Mills’ (2000) concern in ‘“Ideal Theory” as 
Ideology’ that moral theory in its idealizing form is silent on oppression and that 
this silence will distort or erase ‘the actual workings of injustice in human 
interactions and social institutions’ (168). The problem at issue here is that moral 
agents’ experiences of injustice, their interpretations of those experiences, and 
their relationships to unjust and oppressive social institutions, all play critical roles 
in the ethical reasons they form.  
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Politically committed reasons arise out of agents’ particular relationships to 
oppressive circumstances, and from their interpretation of encounters with 
structures of social, political and economic power. Many of the objects of these 
political commitments have moral value under consequentialist and deontological 
theory, which are my focus here. In spite of the moral value they might assign cer- 
tain political concerns, such theories distort and misrepresent people’s reasons for 
pursuing these aims.3 In ideal theory, an agent’s own politically committed 
reasons will appear useful merely as additional incentives for moral action, or they 
will be morally irrelevant. Second, ideal moral theory misunderstands the ethical 
nature of agents’ attachment to the objects of their commitment. Ethical reasons 
that arise from political commitment cannot be understood solely from within 
ideal theory’s framework of ethical reasons. A person’s social location with 
respect to oppres- sion plays an essential role in the process of forming and living 
out their political commitments. If we are to understand the relationship between 
political commit- ment and ethical reasons, we must allow that social location 
plays a role in the con- struction of people as moral subjects. Political commitment 
reveals to us ways our social location may be ethically relevant and shapes our 
subsequent ethical reasons to oppose injustice or to work for political 
transformation.  
2.2 Political Commitment and Ethical Reasons  
The politically committed person desires to effect some change in the social, polit- 
ical and/or economic order that she judges as unjust and oppressive. Political com- 
mitment need not be self-consciously political in the sense that the individual must 
be able to describe it as political or see it as such.4 Political commitment can be a 
significant part of someone’s ethical outlook and moral self-evaluation; indeed, 
some people frame their political commitments in ethical, rather than political, 
terms. When political ends and concerns shape ethical choices in an ongoing way, 
these ethical concerns will also be political commitments.  
Political commitments that frame a person’s ethical outlook and choices have at 
least four features in common. (1) They arise out of someone’s dissatisfaction with 
the current social and political order. (2) Their goal is to address a significant 
element in the social and political order (e.g., governmental or international 
institu- tions and policies), unjust differences in persons’ social and economic 
power, or the causes and effects of racist, sexist, classist or other forms of 
oppression. (3) They cause a person to evaluate her life and actions (and 
sometimes, the lives and actions of others) in light of the ways these contribute to, 
and are consistent with, the goals of her commitment. (4) She is motivated to act 
on this evaluation such that these commitments play a meaningful role in shaping 
and focusing her ethical outlook, deliberation and choice.  
In claiming that ideal moral theories distort or ignore the ethical reasons that 
political commitment engenders, I do not mean that such theories regard the 
objects of those reasons as either immoral or entirely outside the scope of 
morality. People who have reasons to pursue certain basic objects of political 
commitment to address  
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oppression will often be able to justify those reasons under some consideration 
avail- able within deontological and consequentialist theories.5 I am not concerned 
here with any and all political commitments, but rather with political commitments 
that intend to free people from, or at least help them cope with, oppression. Such 
actions will also promote human dignity, alleviate suffering, promote well being 
and create conditions where people can flourish. The political commitments 
considered here will bring about good ends; it is right that we pursue them.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that ideal theories have some account of why the 
objects of these commitments are morally valuable. For example, oppression 
harms people, and reasons to address certain aspects of these harms will be 
morally permis- sible, and sometimes morally required, under ideal moral 
theories.6 And, if they are not, their impermissibility will stem primarily from the 
other moral ends someone might pursue as an alternative, or from conflict with 
other moral requirements, rather than from a conflict between the account of the 
right and the good and the object of the commitment. However, the abstract 
assessment we might make of their moral value from the standpoint of ideal theory 
is itself an idealization that distorts the ground for these reasons. Without an 
account of the relationship that agents believe they have to oppression itself, we 
cannot fully explain or justify people’s commit- ments, the reasons they elicit or 
the extensive effects they have on their lives. When we overlook the role of social 
location in the construction of the moral subject, as ideal theory requires us to do, 
we also fail to see how socially located experiences shape ethical reasons.  
Since the goals of the political commitments that matter here have an ethical value 
(abstractly conceived) that is not usually in question within ideal moral the- ory, 
the burden of proof is on the person who wants to deny that our reasons to pursue 
political commitments are ethical reasons. Under any neutral understand- ing of 
such reasons, these are ethical reasons. A full account of what constitutes the 
moral would beg the question here since the account one gives depends on the 
moral theory one favors.7 However, politically committed reasons do have many 
features that are recognized as characteristic of ethical reasons. Political 
commitments are normative considerations that people freely accept or adopt. 
People intend to have the value their political commitments express bear on 
current and future choices. In other words, they are prescriptive in some sense 
even if they are more open-ended and fluid than general principles. They are also 
the result of reflection and can be revised in the face of both personal and 
collective reflection. Hence, they are respon- sive to reasons.8  
When we are concerned with the political, we are also concerned with the social 
order, more particularly the structures of power that determine human relations 
and the effects these structures have on human beings. When we turn our ethical 
focus to the political, we evaluate and assess, and affirm or reject, the form these 
structures take in virtue of their effects on human beings. Such ethical conclusions 
transform our reasons for action as well as our moral emotions and attitudes. We 
feel indigna- tion about our shared oppression or anger towards those who benefit 
from it. If we ourselves benefit from oppression, we may feel shame or guilt. 
Political commit- ment orders and organizes this complex of moral belief, 
emotions and reasons in an  
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ongoing way. It is a continuous source of ethical reasons. When we are politically 
committed, we resolve to go on to further our understanding of political structures 
and to reflect on our ethical beliefs and attitudes in order to better address political 
oppression through action.  
Therefore, we can see that political commitment is a site where the ethical 
intersects with the political, and does so in two significant ways. First, it involves 
an ethical evaluation of political structures and effects. Second, a person’s ethi- cal 
assessment of herself and the reasons she has are shaped by her views on the 
relationship she has to these structures of power. Her ethical reasons are therefore 
responsive to her judgments about what political structures do to people, including 
herself, and what she is responsible for in light of her relation to these political 
struc- tures. These reasons may ultimately have diverse sources, although they 
primarily arise out of politically relevant experiences of structural effects and our 
attachment and concern for others who experience similar effects. For example, 
we may have a sense of responsibility toward those who share our political fate, 
particularly in cases of shared oppression.  
It is this second relationship between our experience of political effects and our 
ethical reasons that ideal theory tends to obscure—that the basis for an ethical 
reason itself may lie in our understanding of our relationship to these political 
structures. On these views, the source of ethical reasons cannot account either for 
the ways our relationships to these political structures differ or for their profound 
effect on our ethical outlook.  
Political commitment is rarely a purely individual phenomenon. Political com- 
mitment to address oppression usually occurs because a person identifies with, and 
participates in, some collective understanding such as a liberatory social 
movement. It is almost always grounded in some context of collective action with 
shared polit- ical objectives and methods. Collective action is also usually required 
for political commitment to be effective. Personal motivation for political 
commitment will be enhanced, or even dependent upon, a person’s knowledge that 
others share her goals.  
Nevertheless, political commitment results from the choice of individual agents, so 
it has an important individual dimension. It is also an ethical choice and a way that 
individuals orient themselves ethically in the world. The beliefs and goals of 
politically committed agents have ethical content as well. A person working for 
the ‘Justice for Janitors’ movement might be concerned with dignity, respect, 
fairness, and the suffering caused by poverty-level wages and lack of health care. 
She may judge that the treatment of janitors is wrong, the way the police and 
judiciary treat organizers and protesting janitors is wrong, and that the right thing 
to do (at a mini- mum) would be to pay a living wage to janitors and provide them 
with health care. If I am a janitor fighting for justice, these beliefs may play a 
critical role in the ethical reasons I have. If you are someone who benefits from the 
exploitation of janitors (e.g., because it keeps down the rent in your office) then 
the reason you have to respond to the situation of janitors as a beneficiary of 
exploitation may be different from my reason as a person harmed by exploitation. 
Your ethical reason to sup- port janitors in this case may be shaped by your 
reluctance to endorse an economic structure where you benefit from the 
oppression of others.  
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Some of our ethical reasons arise out of our particular relationship to the situ- 
ation and the interplay between a political commitment and our social location is 
multifaceted. Each influences the other. First, our social location can play a role in 
motivating our commitment. Being Lenca can inspire the commitment to strug- 
gle for Lenca autonomy and survival. However, embracing a political 
commitment, particularly in contexts of oppression, may enjoin us to discover 
ways our social location is relevant for action. Reflection on this commitment will 
show us where our responsibility lies and this may bring us to further refine our 
understanding of the commitment and the actions it may require. When our 
standing political commit- ment generates ethical reasons, it is often because the 
political commitment causes us to realize that our relationship to the situation 
demands a particular response. As one janitor who is active in the Justice for 
Janitors movement explained, ‘It’s hard to fight for what you believe in. . . But I 
have no choice. What kind of mother would I be if I didn’t stand up for my 
children?’9 The political commitment then may go on to shape the ethical reasons 
we have in additional ways, in light of the belief that where we stand in 
relationship to the situation has significant ethical implications. For example, we 
may believe that, when oppressed, our position requires solidarity with others who 
share our political fate. As oppressors, we may choose to use our relative social 
privilege to struggle against a political system that provides us with a position that 
advantages us at the expense of others.10  
2.3 Political Commitment and Ideal Theory  
According to Mills, the abstraction involved in ideal-as-idealized theories makes it 
impossible to understand how injustice works in reality, and thus impossible to 
actu- ally achieve justice. To apply these claims here: First, the need to develop 
standards that do not vary across cases in ideal theory will require that theories be 
unrespon- sive to the ways that actual situations of oppression shape our ethical 
reasons. In the case of political commitment, this will mean that the sources of 
reasons arising out of our interpretation of these situations are rendered invisible 
and irrelevant within ideal theory. The normative priority a person gives to her 
politically committed rea- sons will have to be traceable to another, higher 
justification. If the source lies in a person’s experience of her own oppression, this 
will seem like a happy coinci- dence between a particular case and an 
apprehension that a general moral standard applies. If her ethical motivation to act 
is partly derived from concern about her rela- tionship to structures of oppression, 
this would be regarded as a lucky, but indirect, source of moral motivation (in 
consequentialist theory) or perhaps as an unfortunate distraction from the right 
source of moral motivation (in Kantian theory).  
Second, within actual moral practice, deviations from the ideal model will gener- 
ally be regarded as random deviations, irrelevant to shaping the theory. For 
political commitments, this can be seen in the problem of ‘moral fungibility.’ 
Politically com- mitted agents will not regard their projects as fungible with other 
equally morally valuable projects. Under ideal theory the attachment to their 
particular project will  
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seem like a peculiar idiosyncrasy rather than being attributable to the fact that a 
person’s conception of herself as an ethical agent may be of a piece with her com- 
mitments.  
Third, in ideal theory the moral problem that oppression poses must be subsumed 
under a larger ethical heading (e.g., disrespect, bad consequences). This fails to 
account for oppression’s specific features and the roles they play in shaping 
agents’ reasons. The specificity of our relationship to oppressive social structures 
will there- fore seem irrelevant to our actual ethical reasons even though it may be 
both the cause of our possessing the reason, and the explanation for the form it 
takes.  
Bernard Williams’ (1985) arguments about the dominance of what he calls ‘the 
morality system’ shed light on the first two of these concerns. His account of the 
way social considerations bear on ethical reasons is also consistent with this third 
concern.11 Williams’ critiques of utilitarianism and Kantianism are sometimes 
read as a type of skepticism about ethics itself, but his claim that the morality 
system narrows down the diversity of the ethical field, warping our ethical 
experience, is sometimes overlooked.  
The morality system is therefore a kind of idealization even if it is also ‘the out- 
look or, incoherently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us’ (Williams 1985, 
174). It idealizes by appearing to comprise the whole of ethics, a much more 
complex and often socially laden sphere that resists systematization.  
According to Williams, the hallmark of morality, as opposed to ethics, is the 
notion of moral obligation it depends upon, and the primacy it gives to this notion. 
Williams says a great deal about obligation, but two points are most relevant. First, 
obligations are the focal point of moral deliberation. Our deliberation either issues 
in an obligation or indicates permissibility because we do not violate an 
obligation. Further, obligation shapes our deliberation such that it will generally be 
about dis- crete situations and about what to do in such situations.12 The particular 
obligations I determine I have at specific times will be subsumed under a general 
obligation, ‘so if I am now under an obligation to do something that would be for 
the best, this will be because I have some general obligation, perhaps among 
others, to do what is for the best’ (Williams 1985, 175.) If we feel obligated to 
support a partic- ular cause, ‘we are left with the limp suggestion that one is under 
an obligation to assist some important cause on occasions that are especially 
propitious for assisting it’ (Williams 1985, 181). He calls this ‘the obligation-out, 
obligation-in principle.’ Moral obligation is ‘inescapable.’ Not only am I required 
to do what I am obliged to do but I can only justify failing to act on the obligation 
if I see another obligation that defeats the first one. Thus, ‘only an obligation can 
beat an obligation’ (Williams 1985, 180).  
Williams’ argument provides one invaluable suggestion for conceptualizing a non-
idealized account of ethical reasons: move ethics/morality away from the terrain of 
moral obligation alone toward a view of ethics as a concern for how one should 
live. Political commitment will be a source of obligation in some cases. Far more 
importantly, it is an active component in shaping my ethical life in ways that 
cannot be understood only through the idea of obligation. We are beginning to see 
how things start to go wrong when we disregard this fact, when we start with the 
grid of  
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obligation that morality imposes and then attempt to fit within it the way our 
ethical reasons are shaped by the lives we want to live and the values we want our 
actions to stand for.  
In fact, these broader choices always can be fit within this grid in some way or 
other,13 as we see in my earlier argument that ideal theories give moral value to 
the objects of political commitment. But in this process, most of what matters to 
agents is erased. Fitting these reasons within the obligation grid may make them 
unrecognizable to the person who has them.14 Even worse, the concrete ground for 
her actual reason will be lost. When we turn to political commitment, we see that 
the very source of those ethical pursuits—in a person’s experience of oppression— 
is made irrelevant. Were it not for this experience, she would not pursue them nor 
would she know what specific shape her reasons should take. How, Mills might 
ask, could these be rendered irrelevant? To understand the normative priority we 
give to ethical reasons arising out of political commitment, we must go beyond the 
kind of justification that ideal theory ascribes to such reasons.  
2.3.1 Normative Priority  
We often give normative priority to reasons that arise out of political commitment. 
First, ends promoting political commitments can take precedence over other 
poten- tial ends we might pursue. Second, they will be the subject of an ongoing 
reflec- tion that has many direct and indirect effects on ethical reasoning and 
action. In this sense, political commitment is an ongoing project of developing and 
revising ends, and the choices we make out of these commitments bear on a 
myriad of other choices.  
There are several explanations for the normative priority we give to these ethical 
reasons. First, we believe they are politically and ethically important. Some 
political aims may require priority if we are to see them realized and much may be 
at stake in accomplishing those aims.  
A second reason is that political commitments are not just things we have, but 
things we live. To have them is to make them real in our lives. A political com- 
mitment creates self-imposed demands on us. The context of oppression often 
chal- lenges our ability to satisfy these demands. On rare occasions, the simple 
failure to prioritize a commitment will put the commitment itself in jeopardy. For 
example, many social pressures will pull us away from living feminist 
commitments: when sexism is all around us, the costs of resistance are high and 
resistance requires con- scious effort.  
A third reason to give political commitments priority is to explore their implica- 
tions in our lives. We might want to see to what extent we can live out our 
political commitments, in the spirit of learning and experimentation. We may ask 
ourselves what kind of changes we can make in the way we live and how these 
might trans- form our desires, beliefs and political understanding.  
In other words, reasons arising out of political commitment have priority in two 
senses: in the sense thought to be typical of ethical reasons, that we feel we must  
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or should prioritize them (i.e., that it might be wrong not to), and in the sense that 
we care about them and want to realize them as part of our own self-imposed ideal 
for how we should live. The critical issue here is that these politically committed 
choices are ethical choices, made in light of our individual and collective evalua- 
tions of political contexts, our place within those contexts, and our understanding 
of what we should do from that place. The ability to act in ways consistent with 
our commitment even in the face of ongoing oppression can depend on the 
strength of our conviction that it is ethically necessary to do so. Many things will 
pull us away from this desire; such actions almost always have costs. A newly-
minted law student with anti-racist commitments may not be able to pay off her 
student loans if she chooses to work in poverty law or for prisoners’ rights. If a 
janitor stands up to her overbearing supervisor to defend the right of her pregnant 
fellow janitor to take a break, she may find that stance both frightening and 
difficult. This will be true for practical reasons—it could put her own job in 
jeopardy—and also for psychologi- cal reasons, because simply surviving in 
oppressive class, race and gender contexts requires actors to internalize norms of 
deference that are emotionally unsettling to violate.  
Do people hold fast to such choices primarily because it satisfies their prefer- 
ences? Not at all—these are clearly ethical choices. People are likely to see acting 
consistently with the commitment as right, and failure will produce moral 
emotions of remorse, shame or guilt.15 To recall the issue that Williams raises 
(and Mills echoes), ideal theory encourages us to read these as ethical choices only 
when they can also be justified by some overarching moral consideration, such as 
promoting general happiness or well-being, or treating others as ends of 
themselves. Of course, through such considerations, we can justify certain actions 
arising out of commit- ment. We can cite consequentialist reasons for doing 
poverty law or working for prisoners’ rights rather than working in corporate law 
or for the district attorney. When I try to protect someone else from unjust 
authority, I could be said to stand up for both her dignity and my own. I do not 
claim that these are empty considerations. Instead, they neither represent the 
reason I have nor are they always necessary in order for me to have such a reason. 
Further, without my politically committed belief that what I seek ultimately is to 
change the conditions under which people suffer poverty, unjust imprisonment, 
and inhumane working conditions, I would not have the reason to act as I do. The 
politically committed belief is therefore necessary for my reason.16  
If our explanation depends on an ideal obligation, however, we may lose sight of 
what justifies our reason for prioritizing the committed choice over other alterna- 
tives, or for making the committed choice at all. The ideal justification for the 
action does not capture the sense of ethical necessity a person gives to her reason. 
It is not her justification.  
Further, in some cases, if I give my commitment priority and believe that it gives 
rise to a compelling ethical reason to act, this would be unintelligible within ideal 
theory’s conception of moral obligation. On this view, if I treat some of these 
reasons as ethically compelling, I appear to misunderstand moral requirements or I 
misun- derstand what morality is about. When political commitment is part of my 
ethical  
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conception of myself, however, it may seem to me that a failure to do something 
expressing that commitment is also an ethical failure. Many political commitments 
require us to refuse to collaborate with oppressive structures, whether or not such 
collaboration would directly bring about an evil or require us to perform immoral 
actions. Berta’s refusal to work for World Bank funded projects is an example of 
this kind of refusal.  
Nor can ideal theory make sense of reasons to perform political actions that are 
expressive rather than purposive. For example, within ideal theory, it is hard to 
make sense of actions that are prompted by concerns for political solidarity—the 
idea of standing with others in their oppression—as ethical actions, even when 
people make considerable sacrifices in the belief that these actions are morally 
right. Under some conditions, we could make a higher-order idealized moral 
justification for expressive moral actions, but it would be very tenuous. Many acts 
of solidarity do not (and are not intended to) promote good consequences. Nor are 
they, strictly speaking, acts of beneficence that help others realize their ends. 
Hunger strikes and civil disobedience do have strategic value at times, but some 
see them as a way to express solidarity with those who suffer from war or to refuse 
even symbolic collaboration or cooperation with militarist institutions.  
If people have no other access to actions effecting change, they may not be pri- 
marily concerned about what the action brings about. Instead, their actions may 
have symbolic value. In cases of great urgency or times when little can be 
achieved, a person may be unable to hope for more than being able to express her 
deepest commitments and to attempt to resist oppressive power in the only way 
she can.17 However, such expressive actions are never an obligation on any ideal 
account of moral justification. Nor are they supererogatory since they are too far 
outside of recognized duties to go ‘above duty.’ Further, if ethical justification 
must always take an idealized form, these actions may also be open to ethical 
criticism because the ethical space that they occupy leaves us less room to act on 
other, more ‘real’ obligations. And the costs we incur make us less able to act on 
the obligations we are supposed to have.18  
2.3.2 Fungibility  
It is true that within ideal theory, we may have special obligations, given our 
partic- ular social roles, jobs, particular relationships (e.g., as a parent) and so 
forth. How- ever, in the most basic moral sense, everyone has exactly the same 
general moral obligations. Ideal moral requirements ‘abstract away’ from the 
actual social posi- tions of persons in one crucial way: individual relationships to 
structures of social, political and economic power are not thought to directly 
determine the ethical rea- sons we will have.19 At most, such circumstantial facts 
are relevant only because they determine our opportunities for moral action. Our 
ethical failures, if they occur, come from the failure to satisfy general moral 
obligations that apply equally to everyone. Two issues arise here. The first 
problem is that of moral fungibility: on  
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ideal accounts of obligation, we can discharge our moral obligations in a variety of 
ways. If we are engaged in a project of moral worth, we do nothing wrong if we 
substitute that project for another one of equal moral worth. What then do we say 
of people who believe that it would amount to ethical failure to substitute non-
political moral aims for politically committed moral aims?  
This question of fungibility helps us understand the close relationship between 
political commitment and ethical agency. When a person fails to prioritize certain 
political commitments in circumstances that threaten them, she can see that failure 
as a profound ethical failure. An explanation for this belief lies both in the actual 
importance the person believes the commitment has, and in the fact that political 
commitments are central to her conception of herself as a moral agent.  
It is not the case that political commitment has no ethical relevance within ideal 
theories, even if it is absent from the explicit discussion of moral action these the- 
ories provide. If ideal theories were to grant a role for ethical reasons arising out of 
political commitment, what might this role be? Within ideal theory, political 
commitment itself does not give rise, on its own, to ethical reasons. Within conse- 
quentialist theory, however, it seems that political commitment could be desirable, 
depending on its content. And within Kantian theory, it is sometimes morally 
worthy or at least permissible. In consequentialist theory, political commitment 
could be an important source of moral motivation, one that would get a person to 
perform many actions that have good consequences. In indirect consequentialist 
theory, a person might believe that she is performing the action out of political 
commitment and not for its immediate consequences; that might be a good thing 
since awareness of the ‘true’ consequentialist justification could sap her 
motivation. Ultimately, however, it does not matter for our moral evaluation of her 
action whether or not she has the political commitment. The commitment itself 
may or may not have instrumental value.  
In ideal theory, certain kinds of moral actions can have what might be called 
‘moral equivalency.’ If I am supposed to perform an action A that has good con- 
sequence A1, I can substitute B (an action with an equally good consequence B1) 
for A, and it is a matter of moral indifference whether I perform A or B. I may be 
able to save lives by becoming an investment banker and donating money to 
poverty relief. From within the consequentialist perspective, this is no better or 
worse than engagement in a political movement to challenge the structures of 
class, race and gender that cause poverty. (It may in fact be worse to engage in the 
political action if it helps fewer people, but the question of moral equivalence is 
different from the question of demandingness, which I set aside here.)  
Political actions sometimes benefit other people directly. In Kantian theory, many 
of these actions could be considered acts of beneficence. Oppression interferes 
with the ability of others to act on their ends, and it violates their dignity. In acting 
on my political commitments, I am acting in accord with wide or imperfect duties 
to promote the dignity of others and to treat them as ends in themselves. (I may 
not be acting from duty unless I am primarily motivated by reverence for the moral 
law.) I could satisfy imperfect duties of beneficence in many ways. Anti-racist 
work will promote the dignity of others but I would equally discharge my duty to 
help  
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others with their ends by volunteering to coach the local soccer team or running 
errands for the neglected elderly at the local old-age home. If I do nothing wrong, 
I am permitted to prefer my politically committed goals (and they are morally 
worthy if I have the right kind of motivation for them). However, within Kantian 
theory, we cannot get a purchase on my belief that the pursuit of my politically 
committed goals may be far more important ethically than any other action I might 
perform.  
Political commitment makes us unwilling to grant that I sacrifice nothing of ethi- 
cal importance when I forego my political aim for another aim of equal moral 
value. The political nature of the commitment becomes very clear at this point. 
Substitut- ing one moral value for another fails to satisfy my sense of what ethics 
requires of me here because my relationship to the political situation itself 
demands a response. A Chicana who works for justice in her own community may 
think it is simply wrong for her to do nothing while Mexican nationals die trying 
to cross the border between the United States and Mexico, and are rounded up into 
detention centers where they lack all political rights. For her, it is a moral mistake, 
and a kind of eth- ical inconsistency, if she overlooks the connection between her 
own community’s struggles and the treatment of those struggling to cross the 
border. A white person may believe that she cannot in good conscience benefit 
from white privilege in a racist society without putting her effort into political 
action that opposes racism. To fail to act seems to endorse her own unjust 
privilege.  
That is, political commitment makes us see that the present political situation 
demands something ethically of us now, something that we cannot discharge in 
other ethical ways. First, we do not believe there is a morally equivalent action if 
that action fails to engage with oppression we understand to have a particu- lar 
connection to us, whether as victims or beneficiaries. Second, we may see the 
failure to address oppression as a profound ethical failure even if we utilize the 
opportunity to perform some ethically equivalent action. On ideal theory, Berta’s 
commitment to the survival and autonomy of the Lenca might be praiseworthy. 
But she would do nothing wrong in acting on her deliberative latitude to choose 
other ethical aims and give up the struggle for Lenca survival. While I cannot 
speak for Berta, it is not at all hard to imagine that in the case of such dire 
oppression a person could perform a host of very praiseworthy actions and still 
believe she did the wrong thing in this case by failing to act on her political 
commitment to address oppres- sion. The situation itself, and my interpretation of 
my place within it, may call on me to do something. Political commitment 
expands my moral responsibilities beyond the bounds of ideal moral obligation. 
Whatever else I do to help others or to make their lives better, I cannot rest easy 
within a regime that tortures people, for exam- ple, just because I also gave 
comfort to many neglected elderly in my neighborhood. This does not require me 
to have the absurd thought that the neglected elderly are in some way less morally 
valuable than those who are similarly oppressed as I or those who are victims of 
the regime in which I live. Rather, my place within a struc- ture that oppresses 
people and my reflection upon that place gives me an urgent and pressing moral 
responsibility that goes beyond my moral obligation to consider the dignity or 
well-being of everyone around me.  
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2.4 Justification  
The discussion of fungibility shows that our ethical choice to act on one reason 
rather than another is responsive to the circumstances of oppression and our social 
location relative to those circumstances. A further question is why we have the 
par- ticular ethical reasons that we have in oppressive contexts. I pose this 
question for the moment not as a question about justification, nor about all ethical 
reasons, but about the origins of a particular type of politically committed reason. 
This is more than the question ‘why do you care?’ or ‘why does that matter to 
you?’ That ques- tion about motivation lies at the heart of questions about the 
source of certain rea- sons to pursue political goals. Many people do not care 
about oppression; we could ask them ‘why don’t you care?’ And many do care (at 
least to some extent) but do nothing. It is possible to contemplate and witness 
things we abhor and fail to act. It is also true that we can understand, and care 
about, the general moral considera- tion that oppression falls under in ideal theory 
without necessarily recognizing the wrong of oppression or acting upon it.20 It is 
possible to know and care a great deal about dignity or the way suffering detracts 
from overall happiness and fail to notice many instances of oppression. And, if we 
wanted to understand why certain ethical agents, but not others, attend to 
oppression and try to address it, our best explanation will depend on their 
experience of oppression and their collective commitment to overcome it. That 
fact is relevant to the issues raised in this paper, even if it is not the basis for my 
argument.21  
One interpretation of the claim that what I have a moral reason to do depends on 
my social location is not very controversial. In any moral theory, my actual 
reasons depend on what I have opportunity to do and thereby on my 
circumstances. Sup- pose there is a general universal reason to ︎ when moral 
consideration Q is present. If moral consideration Q is not present or I can do 
nothing then I don’t have an extant or concrete reason to  . However, we can all 
still have a standing reason to   when Q is present. If oppression is a moral 
wrong, everyone has a reason to   to oppose it, but if they cannot, they have a 
reason to support or approve of others’  ing. In other words, we still have the 
same general ethical reasons even if those reasons play out differently in actual 
circumstances. Within ideal theory, my social location affects my circumstances in 
this way and can affect what I actually have reason to do. On this interpretation, 
however, social location itself does not play the role in justification that I have 
suggested it has. We can grant that an agent-neutral version exists for every moral 
reason that can apply to every person regardless of social location, and that social 
location will affect opportunities to act on this rea- son. However, on this view 
social location with respect to oppression still plays no critical role in justifying 
the kind of reasons we have.  
It is questionable how much explanatory work the above account does in helping 
us to understand what we have reason to do. To understand reasons to address the 
wrong of oppression, it will not be sufficient. First, our social location with respect 
to oppression gives us actual ethical reasons to do things we would not have rea- 
sons to do from another social location. We can universalize such reasons, but this 
universalization will be too idealized to make sense of our reason in real terms, 
i.e.,  
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in terms that make them reasons for action. Second, the full justification for our 
moral reason sometimes depends on beliefs based on evidence that lies in the 
expe- rience of, and direct reflection upon, oppression. This doesn’t deny that any 
moral reason can be described in an agent-neutral form, but it does deny that the 
level of abstraction described above tells us much about the ethical reasons people 
have in situations of oppression or why they have those reasons.  
Take the example of acts of self-respect, or what might be called ‘standing up’ in 
conditions of oppression. In actions like these, agents resist and refuse to comply 
with the demeaning images or standards placed upon them within oppressive cir- 
cumstances, sometimes by other individuals and sometimes more nebulously 
within the culture. Such actions can be public or private. Since they are acts that 
affirm the worth of the self, they are probably made better sense of within Kantian 
the- ory than within most forms of consquentialism.22 (They could contribute to 
good consequences when they are public, but here, the version of 
consequentialism one holds will matter a bit.) So, one example of standing up 
might be walking off the job when treated in a racially derogatory way or not 
conforming to standards of personal behavior or appearance that are demanded of 
one because of cultural standards that are subordinating. Simply refuting a 
subordinating idea or image by speaking out is another very common form of 
standing up, one that requires considerable courage for people with little social 
power. The ethical reason for these actions can be uni- versalized in some way, 
such that we could have a prima facie reason that ‘anyone who is demeaned by 
oppressive actions or images within the culture should act in ways to signal their 
refusal to grant credence to such actions or images.’  
But of course, not everyone is demeaned in contexts of oppression. On the con- 
trary, members of the dominant group may have politically committed ethical rea- 
sons to avoid demeaning others. If we generalize this to the point where (a) 
oppres- sion as its own social category drops out, and (b) an agent’s specific 
relationship to oppression drops out, then we lose the very point of standing up as 
an act of resistance. It is true that ‘everyone has an ethical reason to resist being 
demeaned by others’ or even more generally ‘everyone has an ethical reason to 
resist acts that demean,’ but the action only makes sense within its political 
context and from a par- ticular social location. The only reason the situation is 
demeaning is because I am oppressed, i.e., because of my social location. 
Moreover, you can’t be, unless you share that location. Here, social location just is 
necessary to understand our ethical reasons. It is not merely the thing that gives 
me the opportunity to act, it is the very grounds for my action.  
There is something very compelling about the idea that others have my reason to 
effect a political change to overcome my or others’ oppression. The idea of an 
agent- neutral reason makes this possible.23 Persuasion plays a role in political 
activism and moral transformation and it may seem that the goal of persuading 
others is to get them to share my ethical reasons. Those who oppose just political 
projects do so mistakenly. If they want to be ethical, then they have to correct 
injustice and oppose oppression. But how do I get others to share my reason? 
While it is absurd to think that Paul Wolfowitz, who headed the World Bank while 
the project was initiated, really did share Berta Caceres’ reason to stop the El 
Tigre dam, it is arguable that  
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he should have shared it. Wolfowitz’s own interests and ideology probably got in 
the way of his seeing that he has a reason, or his motivation to act on it. However, 
we could perhaps still rely on moral recalcitrance as our primary explanation 
rather than needing to assume his reasons would be transformed by an 
understanding of the oppressive nature of the dam and his relationship to that 
oppression.  
Even from the standpoint of the ideal sympathetic observer, a myriad of rational 
considerations tell against the idea that the El Tigre dam ultimately promotes good 
consequences. Hydroelectric dams quickly become obsolete. The El Tigre dam is 
a $1.5 billion project in one of the world’s poorest nations, and uncountable suf- 
fering could be relieved by spending that money elsewhere. The dam will displace 
20,000 people. Even the dam’s specific impact on the Lenca people has moral 
rele- vance from an ideal standpoint. Their displacement will destroy a culture 
they have maintainted during 500 years of repression. It may not seem that we 
need to per- suade someone like Paul Wolfowitz of more than the truth of 
consequentialism to persuade him he has a reason to work against the building of 
the El Tigre dam.  
To really make sense of how oppression affects the ethical reasons we have, 
however, we must consider whether Paul Wolfowitz can share the actual ethical 
reasons of someone like Berta Cáceres who is ‘organizing to defend Lenca 
territory’ to ensure that her people survive.24 Since this is the basis of the ethical 
reason to organize against the dam, we must consider whether a general 
justification for the undeniable ethical good of preserving a whole people from 
destruction captures the reasons of those who are inside this struggle, i.e., the 
reasons arising from the Lenca’s experience of oppression. Can the reasons be 
shared by someone who does not have the experience to understand how such 
circumstances are oppressive? Do our own relationships to oppressive structures 
provide us with particular reasons that others do not share?  
In considering the understanding of political circumstances that reflection upon 
socially located experiences open up for us, we encounter issues of both ‘theoreti- 
cal knowledge’ and practical knowledge—knowing how, rather than knowing that. 
Even for the oppressed themselves, it takes effort to understand the complex 
effects that oppressive structures have on people. Here again, a highly general 
form of what we have reason to do, as well as a very general justification of that 
reason, is useless without specific knowledge of oppressive circumstances. 
Oppression causes suf- fering and interferes with our well-being. It undermines 
our dignity and makes it impossible for us to act on our ends.25  
Yet, what, exactly, are we to do about oppression? An oppressed person is not like 
someone drowning in a river who only needs saving, or someone in the hospital 
who needs to be visited.26 Reflection upon socially located experiences can be 
nec- essary to recognize the wrongs of oppression but even more so to arrive at 
reasons concerning them.27 What reasons do we have when we recognize these 
wrongs? To answer this requires experience that makes possible reflection upon 
the actual circumstances of oppression. Since reason requires action, it makes little 
sense to say that we have reason to   when moral consideration Q is present 
unless it is also possible for us to know what  ing means with respect to moral 
consideration Q. If we understand Q through the notion of dignity, what specific 
reasons do we have to  
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act when oppression undermines dignity? Everyone has a general reason to rectify 
oppression but coming to actually have such ethical reasons in the first place usu- 
ally results from embracing a political commitment that directs our responsibility 
toward the oppressed person in that situation. And in the absence of the reflection 
that political commitment makes possible, it will be very unlikely we will know 
what to do.  
Political commitment—particularly in its collective form—is perhaps the most 
important way that people work together to develop the knowledge they require in 
order to determine where their ethical responsibilities lie and what actions would 
best meet those responsibilities. Berta does complex epistemological work as she 
shows privileged citizens of the United States and Canada what World Bank 
projects like hydroelectric dams do to the oppressed people they affect. Her 
experience gives her knowledge of the way both local and global conditions 
impact the Lenca. That knowledge is indispensable to any meaningful ethical 
assessment of the Lenca’s situation. Such epistemic work must first occur before 
anything can be done, before there can be any reason to   at all. This is not to say 
that she cannot convince outsiders of many of these facts. These facts about 
oppression are not necessarily inaccessible to others, even if knowledge of them 
must be mediated through the interpretations of those who directly experience 
them.28 Nevertheless, the ethical reasons they engender in others who do not share 
her conditions necessarily have to account for their different relationship to 
oppressive structures.  
2.5 Conclusion  
I do not deny that we have universal ethical reasons to oppose oppression or con- 
tend that the moral considerations raised within ideal theory are empty. However, I 
have showed here that we may lose something crucial as we translate some ethical 
reasons arising out of political commitment into universal reasons for every agent. 
That is, we cannot universalize every concrete or actual reason to oppose oppres- 
sive circumstances. One worry that might be raised is that, if some of these ethical 
reasons to oppose oppression depend upon a commitment we have adopted and 
our reflection on our social location in light of that commitment, this amounts to a 
denial of general or universal reasons to oppose oppression. The argument here 
does not deny the existence of universal reasons to oppose oppression or reasons 
to pursue the ethical goals of politically committed agents. Instead, it argues that 
such general reasons do not, on their own, generate or justify all the ethical 
reasons that arise out of an agent’s political commitment.  
Thus, the argument may be compatible with some forms of particularism.29 Mills 
(172) cautions us:  
There are many dangers in particularism, whether individual or group-based.  
Theory necessarily requires abstraction, and to concede this realm to the adversary is an odd way 
of challenging him.  
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One concern here has to do with the status of non-idealist work as theory. Yet 
another is that we won’t be able to make a critique of oppressive circumstances 
that is wide enough or broad enough to appeal to the oppressed and oppressors 
alike. Rejecting universalism ‘risks the dangers of relativism, which makes it 
difficult to affirm that, objectively, women and people of color are indeed 
oppressed—not merely that they believe they’re oppressed.’ In addition, he says, 
‘the mainstream apparatus (e.g., of justice and rights) then becomes a necessarily 
alien tool in the oppressor’s arsenal, rather than a weapon to be used and turned 
against him’ (172).  
The argument I have given suggests that this worry is misplaced even if some 
particularist elements may show that universal obligation cannot take us as far as 
we need to go to understand ethical reasons arising out of oppression. Being 
suspicious about the claim that there is a universal version of all of our ethical 
reasons need not lead us to reject universalism in every form whatsoever. For 
example, nothing I have argued denies that certain kinds of lives are better for 
people than others, or that an ethical life will be one in which we strive to create 
conditions where people can lead better lives. Nor is it nonsensical to appeal to 
general ethical considerations like dignity. On the contrary, such appeals will be 
much more convincing when they are grounded in concrete ethical claims arising 
out of people’s actual experience of oppressive circumstances.  
We cannot arrive at the knowledge we need to act and hence at ethical reasons that 
are actual reasons for action without a reference to concrete experience. Politi- cal 
commitment makes it possible for us to use experiences of oppression to develop 
new understandings of ethical possibilities. Moreover, political action itself 
dissem- inates knowledge. Berta has a goal in working with United States and 
Canadian citizens, with other indigenous rights groups and with local groups: to be 
rationally persuasive to others—to teach them what she knows about the history of 
Lenca oppression and the structures that must be abolished to overcome that 
oppression. Those in certain social locations will make the ‘discoveries’ necessary 
to give us the tools to dismantle the structures that oppress us.30 Political 
commitment, which can be entered into from (and experienced differently 
through) many different social locations, is in part a commitment to attend to, and 
be ethically transformed by, the knowledge that such discoveries make possible.  
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Notes  
1. Although political pressure by COPINH and other groups did delay it, construction on the dam 
began in June of 2006. In Spanish, COPINH is Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Pop- 
ulares e Indígenas de Honduras.   
2. Berta has received credible death threats. Two Lenca activists, Fabian Gonzalez and Santos 
Carillo, were assassinated in 2003.  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3. There are many versions of consequentialism and many interpretations of Kantian theory, but 
because my arguments are about the structure of these theories, I do not go into exten- 
sive detail about how each version would differently handle the cases I describe. More- 
over, I do not deny that some versions of these positions could target oppression directly. 
Because consequentialism is so flexible in its content, for example, a version of conse- 
quentialism could focus on oppression as an undesirable consequence and liberation from 
oppression as a consequentialist goal. Moreover, the Kantian idea that persons are of 
equal moral worth, and that human dignity is of critical moral concern, is far from 
morally irrel- evant in situations of oppression. What I contend is that this 
underdetermines agents’ rea- sons to such an extent that we cannot get an explanation for 
why someone has a reason to act in particular cases of oppression. For that, we need an 
account of how reflections on her relationship to oppression and choices arising from that 
reflection shape her ethical reasons. These views—by virtue of the way they are 
structured—cannot give us such an account.   
4. For example, Anna Politkovskay (2007), who was assassinated for her journalistic work 
exposing human rights abuses in the war in Chechnya, disavowed an explicitly political 
goal for her work. As she says in her book Putin’s Russia, ‘I am not a political analyst. I 
am just one human being among many, a face in the crowd of Moscow, Chechnya, St. 
Petersburg and Russia.’ (12). While it makes sense to see her response to the horrors she 
saw in Chechnya as an ethical response, her work shows that making sense of those 
horrors did require her to confront the political power structure in Russia. I do not claim 
that the political and the eth- ical are easily disentangled but only that we fail to 
understand someone like Politkovskay’s commitment to journalistic truth and the 
sacrifice she made for it if we fail to recognize how it was prompted by the political 
context she found herself in and her sense of responsibility within that context.   
5. Neither consequentialism nor deontology can explain or fully justify the actual reasons that 
result from political commitment. However, an account available to ideal theory will also 
recommend attention to some of the problems caused by oppression. Of course, not every 
reason stemming from political commitment is justifiable on deontological or 
consequential- ist grounds. Clearly some conflicts arise between deontological 
restrictions, for example, and what someone thinks politically necessary to overcome 
oppressive circumstances. Someone might think that some forms of deception are 
justified in the pursuit of political goals— to protect a political action from police 
disruption, for example. Even if such actions are impermissible on deontological grounds, 
however, the point is that the overarching political commitment and its ethical purpose 
will not be incompatible with valuing others as ends in themselves. What is missing when 
political commitment is absent is a connection between a moral commitment to value 
others as ends in themselves and the actual political project and its ethical reasons. People 
with the right kind of political commitment do respect others, attend to dignity, and so 
forth, but these concerns alone do not explain their actual reasons, nor do they fully 
justify what those reasons are reasons to do.   
6. The claim is not that these accounts of oppression involve a correct analysis of oppression. Nor 
does it mean that they necessarily offer the correct account of what makes oppression 
wrong. It is simply that—at the very least—the effects of oppression on people are 
morally relevant from the perspective of any ethical theory. The fact that some theories 
overlook oppression or subsume it under a much more general wrong still means that 
aspects of oppression—and what must be done to address them—will not be targeted. For 
example, the specifically political aspects of the harm done by oppression will not be 
well understood if our focus is primarily upon someone’s ability to realize the ends she 
already has or upon satisfaction of her preferences or other consequentially-based goals. 
Oppression deeply com- promises the ends and preferences we have.   
7. I do not argue here for the claim that all of our ethical reasons operate in the way that polit- 
ically committed reasons do. However, a view that seems promising for explaining the 
ways that political structures impact ethical reasoning is that of Margaret Urban Walker 
who argues that we should ‘locate morality in practices of responsibility that implement 
commonly shared  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understandings about who gets to do what to whom and who is supposed to do what for whom’ 
(2007, 16). In particular, Walker’s view explains why politically committed agents prioritize 
ethical reasons arising out of political commitment in a way that goes beyond any universal 
obligation they might be said to have. If ‘morality itself is a disposition of powers through an 
arrangement of responsibilities’ (2005, 106) then the decision of moral agents like Berta to take 
up highly specific and demanding responsibilities would be explicable by the ways in which she 
has been assigned responsibility, and embraced it, because of her mem- bership in the Lenca 
community. The fact that I might regard it as a great moral failing to ignore oppression within my 
sphere even if I act on morally equivalent projects can also be explained by the fact that this 
involves shunning a responsibility I believe I have. However, the argument that political 
commitments engender ethical reasons may not require that all our ethical reasons arise out of an 
arrangement of responsibilities.  
This does not entail their having a wholly rational basis.  Autumn Jackson, quoted in 
www.laborresearch.or/story2.php/42, accessed 3/10/07. Note that these concerns are both 
general—i.e., what mothers should do for their children—and highly specific, since her 
circumstances require her to stand up in a situation of oppression that will not be generalizable to 
other mothers who do not experience oppression. It is the situation she finds herself in that gives 
her a moral reason to act and, as I will argue below, she thinks she must act. This suggests she 
would be reluctant to regard her action as either supererogatory or fungible with other morally 
equivalent actions.  One issue is whether there are more general ethical requirements arising out of 
social loca- tion that aren’t tied to political commitment. For example, is there a requirement on 
those who benefit from a system of oppression to resist that system? I don’t take up this more 
general question. The discussion here concerns voluntarily assumed political commitments and 
the way they shape ethical reasons rather than more general ethical requirements aris- ing out of 
social location. However, those who take up political commitments may believe that it is not 
merely optional to act on some of the ethical reasons stemming from that commitment.  For 
example, in discussing Kant’s view of practical necessity Williams (1985, 191) says that ‘the 
agent’s conclusions will not usually be solitary or unsupported, because they are part of an ethical 
life that is to an important degree shared with others. In this respect, the morality system itself, 
with its emphasis on the “purely moral” and personal sentiments of guilt and self-reproach, 
actually conceals the dimension in which ethical life lies outside the individual.’  Of course, some 
obligations are ongoing, such as the obligation to utilize one’s talents, and other obligations to 
develop one’s moral character. But these still focus on determining par- ticular choices in 
particular situations.  Note Mills’ discussion of whether one can simply apply ideal theory to the 
problems that would arise in nonideal theory, such as the problem of racism (176). The analogous 
point there would be that certain effects of racism are, for example, incompatible with Rawls’ 
principles of justice. However, e.g., having positions and offices open to all would not eliminate 
racism. (Nor would the difference principle or the principle of equal liberty do so.) That is, 
Rawls’ account is radically incomplete when it comes to race and cannot be just mechanically 
applied to deal with the problem of racism. If liberal theories of this kind were to address racism, 
they would have to actually talk about race and racism. (And this will require nonideal 
theorizing.) A (question-begging) temptation there is to say that what matters about racism when 
it comes to justice is only what can be understood through the parameters of liberal theory as it 
stands. Similarly problematic is the claim that the moral content of politically committed reasons 
can only be what the morality system says it is.  See Michael Stocker (1976). The similarity 
between Stocker’s argument and the case here is that the justification for the ethical reason that is 
available through ideal theory is not the agent’s justification. What results may not be quite the 
schizophrenia Stocker describes. However, what is most ethically relevant in the situation—the 
existence of oppression—has a tangential and second-hand relevance. Further, the priority the 
person gives to her reason  
14.  
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may also appear unjustifiable on moral grounds because she believes the situation demands  
something more or something different than the ideal justification would.  
15. Right and wrong are not necessarily idealized notions. They can depend on obligations 
that  arise out of commitment and context rather than universal covering obligations.   
16. Ethical situations are highly complex matters. Political commitments will usually be 
accom- panied by a complex of other ethical concerns such as compassion for those who 
suffer, indignation about violations of dignity, and many other morally relevant 
considerations. A naturalist and non-idealist account of ethical reasons does not require a 
single sufficient justi- fication for such a reason. Therefore, I do not contend that political 
commitment is a sufficient reason in such a situation; rather, I allow that a variety of 
moral considerations may play a role and these considerations always interact with 
political commitments in the cases at issue  here.   
17. Consequentialists might argue that such actions inspire others to perform political 
actions  with greater utility, and so they do have good consequences after all. But this only 
pushes the question back. If they produce no political gains themselves, why would they 
inspire others? They are inspiring as political and ethical statements, i.e., statements of 
commitment. What others attend to is the very fact that they express commitment, and if 
people did not see the moral value in the expression itself, the actions would not be 
inspiring.   
18. This may be one concern expressed in Williams’ integrity argument. However, I take it 
that more than integrity is at stake in actions that express solidarity with others. While the 
attempt to disavow connection with evil structures and to refuse to be an agent of 
injustice oneself may be tied to integrity, the focus on connection with others and the 
commitments they share with oneself can be grounded in a concern for those others as 
well as an expression of shared ethical and political identity. See Williams and Smart 
(1973).   
19. See Mills, 166.   
20. See Mills, 174–180. ‘If it were obvious that women were equal moral persons, meant to 
be  fully included in the variable “men,” then why was it not obvious to virtually every 
male  political philosopher and ethicist up to a few decades ago?’(Mills, 176.)   
21. Mills mentions one central explanation of this fact: ‘that people’s social location may 
both blind them to important realities and give them a vested interest in maintaining 
things as they  are. . .’ (Mills, 180)   
22. A person has a narrow duty to avoid servility on the Kantian view but it seems unfair 
to  regard a failure to stand up as an act of servility, since the primary moral wrong is 
caused by oppressive agents or institutions rather than by oneself. It would be an undue 
burden on us to require us to actively combat each and every instance of oppression or 
risk being called servile. Internal refusal to take on the demeaning idea or imagery also 
counts. (In fact, people find very complex ways to resist oppression, both psychologically 
and socially, when speaking out is life-threatening.)   
23. Thomas Nagel (1979, 90–91) first introduced the idea of agent-neutrality. Here, I do not 
engage with the large debate as to whether all reasons for action have an agent-neutral 
form. See Christine Korsgaard (1996, 133–134).   
24. ‘Heirs of Lempira Struggle for the Land,’ www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/ 
honduras/4299.html. Accessed December 15, 2007.   
25. Here again, we might need to consider what ends people would have if they were not 
oppressed.   
26. Of course, another issue is that many of the moral wrongs that ideal theory purports to 
address are tied up in structures of oppression. Thus, the most effective ethical actions 
will require some relationship and engagement with oppression itself. The neglected 
elderly in my earlier example experience marginalization, for example. See Iris Young 
(1990, 53–56).   
27. See Satya Mohanty’s (2000, 39–40) argument that ‘objectivity is inextricably tied to 
social and historical conditions, and objective knowledge is not the product of 
disinterested the- oretical inquiry so much as a particular kind of social practice. In the 
case of social phe- nomena such as sexism and racism, whose distorted representation 
benefits the powerful and  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established groups and institutions, an attempt at an objective explanation is necessarily con-  
tinuous with oppositional political struggles.’  
28. See Henze (2000, 245–249).   
29. For example, the view that political commitments generate ethical reasons for one 
person  that are not ethical reasons for everyone is compatible with a rejection of what 
Urban Walker (2005, 11) calls strict universalism which ‘forbids grounds of judgments 
and consequent affirmings of moral positions which are not compelling for all alike.’ 
However, it does not deny that some moral claims are universally binding on all 
individuals or that there are no true moral principles. For a view that rejects moral 
principles as adequate descriptions of moral situations to which our ethical reasons must 
respond see Dancy (1993, 2004).   
30. According to Mohanty’s realist theory of cultural identity, ‘social struggles of dominated 
groups, for instance, can help produce more objective knowledge about a world that is 
con- stitutively defined by relations of domination. That would help explain why granting 
the possibility of epistemic privilege to the oppressed might be more than a sentimental 
ges- ture; in many cases in fact it is the only way to push us toward greater social 
objectivity’ (2000, 58).  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